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HUMAN ERROR RISK MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY FOR 
RAIL CRACK INCIDENTS 
 
Abstract. The paper presents an innovative approach to modelling the causal relationships of human 
errors in Rail Crack Incidents (RCI) from a managerial perspective. A Bayesian Belief Network 
(BBN) is developed to model RCI by considering the human errors of designers, manufactures, 
operators and maintainers (DMOM) and the causal relationships involved. A set of dependent 
variables whose combinations express the relevant functions performed by each DMOM participant 
are used to model the causal relationships. A total of 14 RCI on Hong Kong's Mass Transit Railway 
(MTR) from 2008 to 2011 are used to illustrate the application of the model. Bayesian inference is 
used to conduct an importance analysis to assess the impact of the participants' errors. Sensitivity 
analysis is then employed to gauge the effect the increased probability of occurrence of human 
errors on RCI. Finally, strategies for human error identification and mitigation of RCI are proposed.  
The identification of ability of maintainer in the case study as the most important factor influencing 
the probability of RCI implies the priority need to strengthen the maintenance management of the 
MTR system and that improving the inspection ability of the maintainer is likely to be an effective 
strategy for RCI risk mitigation. 
Keywords: Bayesian Network, human error, Hong Kong, importance analysis, Rail Crack Incidents, 
sensitivity analysis.  
 
1. Background 
 
Subways are one of main modes of urban transport as they are closely associated with 
passenger daily transportation [1].  However, they are high risk in terms of potential loss of 
destruction of assets and human life. The main reason for derailment and collision are rail 
crack incidents (RCI) [2]. Rail cracks can easily lead to shelling defects on the surface of 
rails, causing track irregularity, derailments and collisions [3]. In Europe, for example, with 
an estimated annual cost of repairing rail damage of 300 million Euros, hundreds of broken 
rails are caused by rail cracks [4]. Although many precautions are taken to ensure a reliable 
and punctual Subway Service System in Hong Kong, the number of subway incidents is 
increasing, with RCI being the most increasing cause of Mass Transit Rail (MTR) delay 
incidents, having risen by 200% from 2008 to 2010 [5]. In particular, the number of RCI 
occurring in the first two months of 2011 was more than the total number in 2008. 
 
 A rail crack is defined by the International Union of Railways (UIC) as a rail which, has 
one or more gaps of no set pattern, apparent or not, the progression of which could lead to a 
rapid rail breakage, irrespective of the parts of the profile concerned [5]. There are several 
causes of RCI. Rail crack initiation life is very sensitive to hydrostatic stress, which 
becomes larger when the wheel load and fiction coefficient increase [7]. Axle load, crack 
location, crack size and rail metallographic have also been studied to analyse their effects on 
fatigue crack growth by fracture mechanics [7]. A rail crack growth model has been 
established, the effects of nine operational environment factors compared, and three factors 
- thermal tension, track curvature and residual stress - identified as having the most impact 
[8]. 
 
 Human errors (HE) play a major part in RCI.  For example, welds are the most 
vulnerable component in the rail [5] and can easily become defective by human errors made 
by designers, manufactures, operators or maintainers (DMOM).  That is, design 
deficiencies caused by the designer, defective weld joints caused by the manufacturer, 
excessive speed or loads caused by the operator, and rail corrosion caused by poor 
inspection and maintenance. Previous studies indicate that these skill-based HE can occur at 
any time [9]. In their respective working contexts, the DMOM are often involved in a 
sequence of events leading to an incident or accident [10] - poor inspection and 
maintenance being only the final act of a long and complex chain of organizational and 
systemic errors. 
 
 Although there has been a large amount of research on the identification of casual 
factors in the field of rail crack management and prevention, most has been based on 
laboratory test experiments and field tests from a technical perspective. However, although 
abnormal or unsafe states of material and machinery are the immediate factors for RCI, the 
DMOM HE mentioned above are the root causes of the incidents. Assessing the impact of 
HE is difficult with traditional technical approaches, which are focused more on providing 
an identification or prediction tool based on laboratory test experiments and field tests of 
special cases [11- 12]. As a result, no empirical studies have yet been conducted to assess 
the impact of HE on RCI from a management perspective. 
 
 To do this involves the development of a complex model to represent the relationships 
between the human participants involved as each is dynamically affected by the others both 
directly and indirectly.  Fault tree analysis (FTA) can be used for this purpose through 
providing an understanding of the logic leading to an unwanted event through a top to down 
deductive failure analysis in which Boolean logic combined a series of lower-level events 
are used to analysis the undesired state of a system. Although the method has been used in 
the identification of the main parties in the maritime transport system and their critical 
activities [10], FTA's weakness is that it cannot be used to describe the causal relationships 
among participants and make inferences concerning the probability of events occurring.  
 
 Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN), on the other hand, have been successfully used to 
integrate the analysis of human and hardware failure in studying the possible association of 
HE with fire incidents in subway operation [13] and evaluating the effects of organizational 
factors in railway operation on Signal-Passed-at-Danger incidents [14]. Both these 
applications of BBN in railway risk management demonstrate an efficient way of 
understanding how HE and organizational failure contribute to railway incidents. In doing 
this, BBN is able to identify possible configurations of events leading to an incident and 
understand the interactions of the factors involved [10]. BBN represents formalism in the 
risk analysis domain due to its ability to deal with probabilistic data and model the 
interdependencies of events by the use of arrow and conditional probabilities [15]. It is also 
one of the simplest approaches in sensitivity analysis and works well even when the number 
of factors is relatively small [10]. 
 
 Hence, the primary purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of HE from DMOM on 
RCI and provide a means of identifying their sources.  The BBN approach is used to aid 
this process and is described in the following section prior to an illustrative application in 
the form of a case study of 14 recent MTR RCI in Hong Kong. 
 
2. Research methodology - the Bayesian Network approach 
 
The term “Bayesian Network” (BN) was coined by Pearl in 1985 [16], which is a directed 
acyclic graphical model or belief network. The set of random variables and their conditional 
dependencies of this probabilistic graphical model was represented by a directed acyclic 
graph (DAG). The probabilistic relationships can be represented by BN. The network can be 
used to compute the probabilities of the presence of various faults once the symptoms 
involved given. The nodes represent variables and are conditionally independent of each 
other. The edges represent conditional dependencies; each node being associated with a 
probability function that takes as input a particular set of values for the node's parent 
variables and gives the probability of the variable represented by the node. The 
corresponding states are reflected by a Conditional Probability Table (CPT) as exemplified 
in Fig 1. 
 
Fig 1. Typical Bayesian network and Conditional Probability Table 
 
 In the discrete case, Bayes’ theorem relates to the conditional and marginal probability 
of events X and Y, provided the posterior probability of Y does not equal zero:  
P( X2｜ X1) P( X1=F) P( X1=T)
F 0.5 0.5
T 0.9 0.1
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 In Bayes’ theorem, each probability has a conventional name: 
 P(X) is the prior probability of occurrence of X provided by statistical analysis of 
historical data, assessment of experts or predictive model based on past data if it 
does not have parent nodes;  
 P(Y) is the marginal probability ignoring the states of X, estimated by Bayesian 
theory; 
 P(Y |X) is the distribution of occurrence of Y given the occurrence of X; 
 P(X|Y) is the distribution of X occurrence of given the occurrence of Y; the value 
of P(X|Y) can be translated into “given a rail crack incident, what is the likelihood 
that it has occurred due to human errors of the designer, manufacturer, operator, or 
maintainer?” 
 
3. Case study: Hong Kong MTR Rail Crack Incidents 
 
The BN approach is applied to a set of RCI that occurred on Hong Kong's MTR system 
over the 2008 to 2011 period. This aims to (1) identify the participants among the DMOM 
contributing most to the RCI by human error, and (2) provide effective strategies for the risk 
management of the RCI by sensitivity analysis. Although the size of the sample data is 
small because rail crack is an unusual incident happened in MTR, human error risk analysis 
of this type incident is still interested by government, manager, and passenger. 
 
 The case study is carried out is three steps comprising Incident Analysis, Qualitative 
Model Formulation and Sensitivity Analysis [17]. The background of the collected incidents 
is introduced in the Incident Analysis step; a Qualitative Model Formulation is established 
based on functions in the DMOM analysis and relationship analysis among these functions 
in the second step; and an importance model and sensitivity analysis model are presented in 
the last step. 
 
3.1 General description of the RCI 
 
The primary causes of the RCI are summarised in Table 1. All the data used in the research 
were collected from rail investigation reports on the website of the Hong Kong legislation 
council and contain 14 RCI.  Of these, two occurred in 2008, six in 2010, and three in one 
month in 2011. Only 30% of RCI were found during general maintenance check-up. 
 
It is also noted that, although RCI on the MTR that lead to isolated transverse fractures 
are less likely to cause train derailments, transverse fractures cause many other costs in 
inspections, train delays, remedial treatments, pre-treatments, derailments and loss of 
business confidence and customer support [18]. 
 
Table 1. Root causes of RCI  
Case Root causes of RCI Date 
1 Defective weld joint by manufacturer 19 Jan 2008 
2 Poor quality welding materials 19 Mar 2008 
3 Defective weld joint by manufacturer 19 Jan 2009 
4 Impurities inside rail head 18 Nov 2009 
5 Corrosion at the rail foot 24 Nov 2009 
6 Defective weld joint by manufacturer 25 Jan 2010 
7 Defective weld joint by manufacturer 13 Feb 2010 
8 Weak weld joint (welded on site) 10 Mar 2010 
9 Weak weld joint (welded on site) 15 Jul 2010  
10 Design deficiency 24 Jul 2010 
11 Weak weld joint (welded on site) 1 Nov 2010 
12 Steel plate fastening bolt broken and replaced by a smaller diameter temporary bolt 13 Jan 2011 
13 Steel cable protection pipe in contract with the underside of the rail. As rails serve 
as a conductor for electrical current, there was intermittent electrical discharge that 
led to arcing. Heat generated from the arcing caused local melting of the pipe and 
underside of the rail at the point of contact. 
19 Jan 2011 
14 The cross-section of welds is slightly larger than that of the rails, the underside of 
welds are compressed more into the rubber padding when trains pass over. The 
concerned weld was located on a curved section of rail and took on the heavier load 
of trains passing over it, creating a higher stress concentration (SC) point that 
developed into a crack at the bottom of the rail and which ultimately led to 
breakage.  
10 Feb 2011 
 
3.2 Qualitative model formulation and the BN mode 
 
At this stage, a qualitative model formulation is first established based on literature review 
and consultation with MTR operators, engineers and maintenance staff. Researchers have 
focused mainly on identifying the technical causal factors related to RCI, such as axle load, 
vehicle speed and traffic density [6]. However, an accident or incident is a consequence of a 
sequence of human errors and associated unsafe behaviour [19]. The technical causal factors 
identified and classified are used to match the HE of DMOM with the technical failure in the 
RCI report [6].  
 
 Jeong's functions allow a better understanding and clarification to be obtained of the 
duties of the four DMOM participants. By analysing the MTR RCI, it is found that most 
incidents are caused not by HE but by a causal sequence [20]. For example, if corrosion is the 
direct reason for rail degradation, it may be that the problem should have been considered by 
the designer and therefore the designer's ignorance of the problem is the indirect reason for 
corrosion. Daily maintenance inspection also determines the occurrence or not of RCI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Qualitative Model Formulation and the Bayesian Network Model 
 
 As there are many indirect reasons for RCI, translating all the cause-effect relationships 
involved into BBN would require a great amount of incident cases to analyse. Therefore, in 
view of the small number of samples collected, both direct and indirect reasons are 
categorized into four broad categories denoting the different participants involved, namely, 
Designer (Des), Manufacturer (Man), Operator (Ope) and Maintainer (Mai) for establishing 
a qualitative model. Hence, there are four causal nodes in the BN model. Also, two 
symptom nodes are needed depending on whether there is a material defect-related stress 
concentration (MatSC) or non-material defect stress concentration (Non-MatSC). A 
qualitative model established by FullBNT in MATLAB is shown in Fig. 2 (the computer 
program is provided in Appendix A), in which the relationships between variables are 
represented by the arcs in the BN. 
 
 
3.3 Importance and sensitivity analysis 
 
3.3.1 Prior and conditional probabilities 
 
There are two ways of assessing the prior and conditional probabilities: objective-based 
prior probabilities and subjective-based prior probabilities, which should be used depending 
on whether the probability distribution of the occurrence of the factors can be obtained from 
the data. The objective-based prior probabilities magnify the uncertainty of the occurrence 
of the events. Therefore, as the RCI cases being analysed are collected from the Legislation 
Council in Hong Kong, the prior and conditional probability analyses are conducted based 
on the subjective method.  
 
 The prior probability is defined as the frequency or count of the occurrences of the 
cause and symptom events within the collected samples, P(X) equals the number of HE 
divided by the number of RCI. There are two possible values for each event {H=occurs, 
N=does not occur}. The prior probabilities of HE of designers (Des-HE) and manufacturers 
(Man-HE) are the occurrence frequencies of Des-HE and Man-HE before the evidence is 
taken into account. The prior probability distribution is a necessary input in calculating the 
MatSC 
Ope-HE
Mai-HE 
Non-Mat
RC 
Des-HE 
Man-HE 
marginal probability and posterior probability. As is shown in Table 2, the prior probability 
of node Des-HE is obviously lower than node Man-HE, which means that the probability of 
Des-HE is less than that of Man-HE. Because there is not enough case, the paper had to use 
the same case for prior probability and BN model analysis. 
 
Table 2. Prior probabilities of nodes Des-HE and Man-HE  
State/Value P(Des-HE) P(Man-HE) 
H 0.21 0.50 
N 0.79 0.50 
 
 The conditional probability is the probability of event X, given the occurrence of 
another event Y and is written in the form of P(X|Y). The HE of the operator (Ope-HE) is 
induced not only by the knowledge and skill of the operators, but also by the Des-HE or 
Man-HE. According to the relationships in the collected cases, the conditional probabilities 
of Ope-HE P(Ope-HE|Des-HE) are equal to the joint probabilities of Ope-HE and Des-HE 
P(Des-HE,Ope-HE) divided by the probabilities of the Des-HE. The conditional 
probabilities of the HE of maintainer (Mai-HE) given the occurrence of Ope-HE, 
P(Mai-HE|Ope-HE) is calculated by the same approach (see Table 3). 
Table 3. Conditional probabilities of nodes Ope-HE and Mai-HE 
State/Value P(Ope-HE =H｜Man-HE) P(Ope-HE =N｜Man-HE) 
Man-HE =H 0.33 0.67 
Man-HE =N 0.18 0.82 
State/Value   P(Mai-HE =H｜Ope-HE) P(Mai-HE =H｜Ope-HE) 
Ope-HE =H 1.00 0.00 
Ope-HE =N 0.46 0.55 
 
 P(Ope-HE=H｜Des-HE=H)=0.3333 means that the occurrence probability of Ope-HE 
is 0.333 when Des-HE occurs. When Des-HE does not occur, the occurrence probability of 
Ope-HE is 0.182. Therefore, we conclude that the occurrence of Ope-HE is induced not 
only by Des-HE but also by other events. Consider Mai-HE, which definitely occurs once 
Ope-HE occurs, because the P(Mai-HE=H｜Ope-HE=H) equals 100%. Now we cannot say 
that Mai-HE is caused by Ope-HE, because it also has a probability of 0.455 when Ope-HE 
does not occur. The same interpretation can be used for Non-MatSC, MatSC and RCI (see 
Tables 4 and 5). 
 
 
 
Table 4. Conditional probabilities of Non-MatSC 
Des-HE Man-HE Mai-HE P(Non-MatSC =H| Des-HE, Man-HE, 
Mai-HE) 
P(Non-MatSC =N| Des-HE, Man-HE, 
Mai-HE) 
H N N 1.0 0.0 
N H N 0.2 0.8 
H N H 1.0 0.0 
N H H 1.0 0.0 
H H H 1.0 0.0 
 
Table 5. Conditional probabilities of MatSC and RCI 
Man-HE Mai-HE P(MatSC=H｜Man-HE, Mai-HE) P(MatSC =N｜Man-HE, Mai-HE) 
H N 0.8 0.2 
N H 0.8 0.2 
H H 0.0 1.0 
Non-MatSC MatSC P(RC=H｜Non-MatSC, MatSC) P(RC=N｜Non-MatSC, MatSC) 
H N 1.0 0.0 
N H 1.0 0.0 
 
 
3.3.2 Importance analysis based on Bayesian inference  
 
In order to identify which participant has the most effect on the occurrence of RCI, an 
importance analysis is conducted by Bayesian inference. The marginal probability of human 
errors of operator O-HE is 
ܲሺܱ െ ܪܧሻ ൌ ܲሺܯܽ݊ െ ܪܧ ൌ ܪ;ܱ݌݁ െ ܪܧ ൌ ܪሻ	 
																											൅ܲሺܯܽ݊ െ ܪܧ ൌ ܰ;ܱ݌݁ െ ܪܧ ൌ ܪሻ  
																											൅ܲሺܯܽ݊ െ ܪܧ ൌ ܪ;ܱ݌݁ െ ܪܧ ൌ ܰሻ  
																											൅ܲሺܯܽ݊ െ ܪܧ ൌ ܰ;ܱ݌݁ െ ܪܧ ൌ ܰሻ             (2) 
 
This is used to calculate the marginal probabilities of causal nodes before the Bayesian 
inference.  The joint probabilities are given by 
ܲሺܯܽ݊ െ ܪܧ;ܱ݌݁ െ ܪܧሻ ൌ ܲሺܯܽ݊ െ ܪܧሻ ∙ ܲሺܯܽ݊ െ ܪܧ|ܱ݌݁ െ ܪܧሻ    (3) 
and hence, 
ܲሺܱ െ ܪܧሻ ൌ ∑ܲሺܯܽ݊ െ ܪܧሻ ∙ ܲሺܯܽ݊ െ ܪܧ|ܱ݌݁ െ ܪܧሻ        (4) 
 The same kind of analysis can also be carried out for the marginal probabilities of 
Mai-HE, Non-MatSC, MatSC and RCI as shown in Table 6, which provides the initial risk 
information involved. 
 
 
Table 6. Marginal probabilities 
Order Code Description  Marginal 
Probability 
1 Non-MatSC* Non-material defects-caused stress  42.65% 
2 MatSC* Material defects-caused stress  40.95% 
1 M-HE(Mai) Human errors and technical mistakes in maintenance stage 57.14% 
2 M-HE(Man) Human errors and technical mistakes in manufacture stage 50.00% 
3 D- HE Human errors and technical mistakes in design stage 21.43% 
3 O-HE Human errors and technical mistakes in operation stage 21.43% 
Note: * is the symptom event, which is the hypothetical node. 
 
 This shows Mai-HE to be the highest risk (57.14%), followed by Man-HE (50%) 
occurrence probability, while D-HE and O-HE are much lower, with the risk of defects falling 
between the two groups. While this suggests that Mai-HE and Man-HE might contribute 
more in leading to an incident, this is not necessarily the case.  This is determined by the 
importance of the causal event - defined as the contribution of the event to the incident as 
represented by the posterior probability in BBN [21], where posterior probability P(X|Y) 
means that “given a result event Y, what is the likelihood that it is induced by causal event X?” 
The posterior probability of Des-HE, given the occurrence probability of a rail crack (RCI), is 
calculated by 
ܫሺܦ݁ݏ െ ܪܧሻ ൌ ܲሺܦ݁ݏ െ ܪܧ|ܴܥܫሻ ൌ ௉ሺ஽௘௦ିுா;ோ஼ூሻ௉ሺோ஼ூሻ                (5) 
 where P(RCI) is the marginal probability of RCI; P(Des-HE; RCI)/P(RCI) is the 
posterior probability given that a RCI occurred; and P(Des-HE; RCI) is the joint probability 
that Des-HE and RCI occur together. We define P(Des-HE| RCI) as the importance of 
Des-HE on the basis of its influence on RCI. The calculation results are shown in Table 7, 
which are provided by FullBNT in MATLAB (the computer program is in Appendix A). 
Table 7. Importance of causal events 
No. Code Description Importance 
1 Non-MatSC* Non-material defects-caused stress  51.38% 
2 MatSC* Material defects-caused stress  48.62% 
1 Mai-HE Human errors and technical mistakes in maintenance stage 71.64% 
2 Man-HE Human errors and technical mistakes in manufacture stage 65.31% 
3 Ope-HE Human errors and technical mistakes in operation stage 25.85% 
4 Des-HE Human errors and technical mistakes in design stage 22.42% 
Note: * is the symptom event, which is the hypothetical node. 
 
 Here, the importance degree of Non-MatSC is higher than MatSC. In other words, 
non-material defects-caused stress has a higher contribution to RCI than material 
defects-caused stress. In terms of the causal events, Mai-HE and Man-HE have the same 
probability of occurrence. However, Mai-HE is more important than Man-HE due to its 
higher contribution to RCI. Therefore, when comparing the human errors of the designer and 
operator, although their probability of occurrence is the same, importance analysis indicates 
that the human error of the operator has more impact than that of the designer. That is to say, 
although they have the same probability of occurrence, their impacts on RCI are different.   
 As Table 6 shows, the HE of the maintainer provides the greatest contribution to RCI 
among the DMOM.  This result coincides with what happens in practice as maintenance 
inspection is the last step prior to the occurrence of RCI. The second important contribution 
to RCI, human error of the manufacturer, is due to material defects caused by welding and 
rail manufacture. Although the importance of Man-HE is lower than Mai-HE, it still plays a 
larger role in contributing to RCI. Des-HE, in contrast, makes the smallest contribution. 
 
 
3.3.3 Sensitivity analysis  
 
A sensitivity analysis of the RCI is carried out on four causal factors (Des-HE, Man-HE, 
Ope-HE and Mai-HE) to gauge the robustness of the results and understand how changes in 
the causal factors influence the probability of occurrence of RCI. A variance-based method 
of probabilistic sensitivity analysis is used. The approach is:  
Sሺߗ௜ሻ ൌ ∆ܲ
ሺܴܥܫሻ
∆ܲሺߗ௜ሻ 	
												ൌ ∆ܲሺܰ݋n െMatSC,MatSC, RCIሻ∆ܲሺߗ௜ሻ 	
												ൌ ∆ܲሺߗଵ,௜, ߗଵ,పതതതതതሻ ∙ ܲሺߗଶ,௜, ߗଶ,పതതതതതሻ∆ܲሺߗ௜ሻ ∙ ܣ 
 
 (6) 
where 
 
1, 1,
1, 1,
( , | )
       ( , | )
       ( | , )
i i
i i
A P Non MatSC
P MatSC
P RC Non MatSC MatSC
   
  
   (7)
 
is a constant, ߗଵ,௜ is the set of non-material caused stress, 1,i is the complementary set of 
1,i ;ߗଶ,௜  is the set of material caused stress, 2,i  is the complementary set of ߗଶ,௜. 
	Sሺߗ௜ሻ	is a relative indicator representing the sensitivity of RCI to the probability of HE from 
the four participants. This framework provides 4×4 experiments with four causal factors in 
four states. The Sሺߗ௜ሻ	results are shown in Table 7 for ±20% and ±10% of the initial P0( i ) 
value.  
Table 8. Sensitivity of RCI to changes in ଴ܲሺߗ௜ሻvalues 
No. Code 
 iS   
-20% -10% 10% 20% 
1 Des-HE 0.089+21.98E-5 0.089+22.28E-5 0.089+22.89E-5 0.089+23.18E-5 
2 Mai-HE 0.080+31.29E-5 0.080-48.98E-5 0.077+90.48E-5 0.077+10.20E-5 
3 Man-HE 0.046-9.91E-5 0.046+56.07E-5 0.063-11.95E-5 0.068+54.03E-5 
4 Ope-HE 0.043+11.05E-5 0.043+2.09E-5 0.043-15.82E-5 0.043-24.78E-5 
This shows that RCI are most sensitive to the probability of Des-HE, with the 
sensitivity becoming sharper as the probability of Des-HE increases. It also indicates that 
Des-HE, although having the smallest contribution, has the greatest marginal utility on RCI.  
Design is the first stage in the life of a rail so that any defects occurring in this stage affects 
the rail state of the following three stages, involving additional work by the manufacturer, 
operator and maintainer. Therefore, the greatest marginal utility coincides with the case in 
practice. The same result applies to Man-HE but with less sensitivity than Des-HE. Figs 3 
and 4 summarise the results. 
 
Fig 3. Sensitivity of RCI to Des-HE 
 
Fig 4. Sensitivity of RCI to Man-HE 
 
 Unlike the Des-HE and Man-HE, the Sሺߗ௜ሻ	of Ope-HE and Mai-HE decreases as 
P଴ሺΩ୧ሻ	increases as the increase in probability of Ope-HE and Mai-HE cannot induce more 
RCI. As Figs 5 and 6 show, the Mai-HE is more sensitive than the Ope-HE. In fact, the 
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contribution of Mai-HE to RCI is the most of the DMOM - indicating that the greatest 
benefits will be obtained by reducing human maintenance errors. 
 
Fig 5. Sensitivity of RCI to Ope-HE 
 
 
Fig 6. Sensitivity of RCI to Mai-HE 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
RCI increase as the subway network becomes more complex and important to community 
life. In seeking to deliver more effective strategies for risk mitigation, therefore, it is most 
important to identify the major influencing factors involved. This paper proposes a new 
method of doing this through the use of BN in developing better risk identification models 
of RCI.  This is particularly useful when the HE of different participants is a crucial issue, 
as it can deal efficiently with small samples and clarify the causal relationships between the 
associated latent and observed variables/factors. A case study demonstrates the use of the 
method for all the RCI occurring in Hong Kong's MTR system for the period 2008 to 2011, 
including the HE of the four participants of designers, manufactures, operators and 
maintainers. 
 The results confirm that, firstly, the maintenance stage is crucial for RCI risk reduction 
as mistakes at this stage contribute over 70% to RCI. Secondly, factors with a higher 
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probability of occurrence contribute more in leading to the incident. Thirdly, RCI is most 
sensitive to the designers' probability of HE. Because design is the first stage in the life of 
the rail, any defects that occur in this stage can induce subsequent mistakes in the following 
stages. Fourthly, in contrast with the operation and maintenance stages, efforts in improving 
the design and manufacture stages have a greatest marginality utility. 
 Importantly, the identification of ability of maintainer in the case study as the most 
important factor influencing the probability of RCI implies the priority need to strengthen 
the maintenance management of the MTR system and that improving the inspection ability 
of the maintainer is likely to be an effective strategy for RCI risk mitigation.  
 However, this study also has its limitations. First, the qualitative model framework is 
not sufficiently exhaustive to reflect the real sequence of causal relationships of RCI. 
Because RCI is an unusual incident happened in MTR, the number of cases is too small to 
conduct a basic causal factor analysis. Second, the importance analysis is conducted using a 
single event (such as rail crack), and so does not take into account any other events. Third, 
sensitivity analysis simply observes the quantitative variation of RCI risk in terms of four 
causal factors, and does not consider the economic impact of RCI or the cost of 
improvement. Further studies are needed to address these deficiencies. Despite all this, the 
research framework and methodology is quite general and clearly suitable for use as a 
support tool for risk management and decision-making processes in a wide variety of 
applications beyond RCI. 
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